Regime change refers to a country’s transition from one type of government, with its specific set of institutions and policies, to another. It can occur through military coups d’état, social revolutions, and even democratization. While older studies have focused on coups and revolutions, a recent wave of research has examined democratization as an agent of regime change.
Regimes change advocates assert that covert armed interventions can accomplish objectives more cheaply and quickly than sustained diplomatic pressure and engagement. However, academic research demonstrates that regime change missions rarely succeed as intended. Instead, they foster unintended consequences that often outweigh their short-term benefits.
The most commonly cited example of regime change is South Africa’s removal of the white minority government largely due to international pressure, and subsequent election of Nelson Mandela as president. However, not all cases follow this pattern.
This article aims to provide a better understanding of the underlying dynamics behind regime change, and shows that there is a wide range of outcomes depending on how the intervention is executed. At the heart of the problem is that externally-imposed leaders face a domestic audience and a foreign audience, each with different preferences. Taking actions to please one audience alienates the other, putting the imposed leader in an impossible position.
We use game theoretic models to examine this dynamic. We show that when a regime has access to public goods G, it optimally sets the amount of these goods to maximize its own office rents. At a later date, citizens decide whether to revolt or not. The regime survives if the share of citizens actively opposing it falls short of its strength, and if it also avoids provoking a civil war.
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